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PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
defendants and appellants petition the court for rehearing of
this case and for modification of its decision herein filed June
18, 1976 to grant appellants1 request for a new trial.

REASONS FOR THIS PETITION
The majority decision (written by Justice Tuckett and
concurred in by Justice Crockett and Justice Maughan) turned on
an issue not raised or argued in either appellants1 or respondents1 briefs previously submitted.

Accordingly, counsel for the

parties have not had adequate opportunity to advise the court of
their cases and arguments on the issue selected by the court as
the basis for its decision.
The issue on which the majority opinion turned was whether
appellants made timely objection to failure by the court to give
its requested instruction No. 19 advising the jury that plaintiff
could not recover if she was contributorily negligent.
Both the majority decision and the dissenting opinion
(written by Justice Ellett and concurred in by Justice Henroid)
concluded that the requested jury instruction No. 19 should have
been given but was not given.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are the same as set forth in the
brief of defendants-appellants previously filed in this case.
The essential sequence of events relevant to the issued raised
in this petition are:
1.

The subject auto-pedestrian accident occurred on

January 13, 1973 (before Utah's comparative negligence statute
was enacted) and was tried in September, 1975 (after the
comparative negligence statute became law).
2.

The trial judge told counsel he was giving defend-

ants1 requested jury instruction No. 19 "in substance" and so
noted thereon. (R-92).

However, the court failed to give that

portion of the instruction stating "One who is guilty of
contributory negligence may not recover from another for any
injury suffered. . ."
3.

While in chambers, counsel for the parties, with

approval by the court, agreed to reserve their exceptions to
the jury instructions for dictation to the court reporter at a
later time.

This stipulation was entered into the court

record. (R-167).
4.

When the court read its instructions to the jury,

counsel for the parties had not been furnished a correlated
copy of the jury instructions.

The only such copy in exis-

tence was taken by the jury into the jury room. (Supplemental
TR-25, 29, 30).
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5.

From notes made by counsel in the trial judge's

chambers at the time the jury instructions were discussed,
counsel for the parties dictated to the court reporter, in the
absence of the judge, their initial exceptions to the jury
instructions.
6.

After the jury had returned its verdict and was dis-

charged, defendants1 counsel first became aware that the
essential portion of its instruction No. 19 had not in fact
been given, contrary to the court's representation.

At a

subsequent hearing, the court expressed concern over its
negligence in failing to give the instruction No. 19. After
hesitantly concluding that the instructions given were adequate, the court granted defendants' permission to supplment
their objections so that the issue of sufficiency of the
instructions could be determined on appeal. (Supplemental TR
28-30).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS
FAILED TO TAKE TIMELY EXCEPTIONS TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
FAILURE TO GIVE THEIR REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 19.
The majority decision of the Supreme Court of Utah found
that defendants' requested jury instruction No. 19 was a
proper one.

However, it held that defendants failed to timely
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except to the courtfs failure to give the requested instruction as required by Rule 51, U.R.C.P., the pertinent part of
which is as follows:
. . . If the instructions are to be given in writing,
all objections thereto must be made before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be
made to the instructions after they are given to the
jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto.
In objecting to the giving of an instruction, a party
must state distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the
foregoing requirement, the Appellate Court, in its
discretion and in the interest of justice, may review the
giving or failure to give an instruction.
The court has previously taken judicial notice of the
prevailing customary practice in Utah for counsel, with approval
of the trial court, to reserve exceptions to jury instructions
for dictation to the court reporter at a later time, usually
when the trial judge is not even present.

See State of Utah

v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d. 410, 490 P.2d 890. Even though the
court notes that the common practice seems ill advised because
it gives the court and opposing counsel no opportunity to
correct errors or omissions which may be pointed out, no case
law has been found indicating that the provisions of Rule 51
may not be abrogated by such stipulation of counsel with
approval of the court.

Nor has this court ever previously

failed to consider on appeal an objection to jury instructions
duly entered into the record after the jury has retired, when
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done according to such stipulation and even though contrary to
Rule 51.
A Utah case apparently not considered by the court in its
decision, but which is clearly applicable here, is Hanks v.
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564 (1960).

In that case,

plaintiff complained that the trial court did not permit him
to make objections to instructions before giving them to the
jury, and that it failed, before instructing the jury, to
inform him of its rulings on his objections and request for
instructions.

Although the court held that the jury instruc-

tions as given in that case were adequate, the analysis set
forth in the unanimous decision of the court authored by
Justice Crockett is directly applicable to this case. The
court stated in pertinent part:
It must be conceded that the parties have a right to
make objections to the instructions to preserve challenges to their accuracy. Rule 51. But Rule 46 provides :
"* * *±f a party has no opportunity to object to a
ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an
objection does not thereafter prejudice him.11
Under such rule, if counsel was prevented from
making objections, he should be deemed to have done so.
The vital question is not when or how the objections
are allowed to be made, but whether the instructions are
correct. What the party is entitled to is a presentation
of the case to the jury under instructions that clearly,
concisely and accurately state the issues and the law
applicable thereto so that the jury will understand its
duties. Unless the procedure followed would militate
against accomplishing that purpose by causing proper
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instructions to be omitted or improper ones to be given,
there would be no prejudicial error and the mechanics of
the procedure would not be of controlling importance.
What has just been said likewise applies to the
claim that counsel was not furnished a copy of the
court's instructions until they were being read to the
jury. The furnishing of a copy of the instructions to
counsel is a convenience and courtesy to hime It lets
him know the theory upon which the court has presented
the case so he can formulate his argument; and facilitates the taking of any necessary exceptions. This
courtesy should be extended at the earliest convenience
of the court. There may have been some delay, but it
appears that counsel did get his copy during the time the
instructions were being given and that he used the same
in taking his exceptions.
The clear implication of the Hanks decision is that if
the mechanics of the procedure, such as failure to furnish
counsel with a copy of the court's instructions when they are
read to the jury, militates against causing proper instructions to be omitted or improper ones to be given, then under
Rule 46 the objecting party will not be prejudiced for any
failure to timely object to an instruction.
Rule 46, U.R.C.P. states:
Formal exceptions to rulings or orders of the court
...-...' are unnecessary. It is sufficient that a party, at the
time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought,
makes known to the court the action which he desires the
court to take or his objection to the action of the court
and his grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is
made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter
prejudice him.
The circumstances in the instant case clearly show that
defendants did not have fair opportunity to object to the
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court's instructions at the time they were made, as set forth
in the following excerpt from Justice Ellett's dissenting
opinion as follows:
In the first place, the trial judge told counsel for
defendant that he would give the instruction in question.
In the second place, in order to hasten the end of the
case, the court on stipulation of counsel, agreed to
permit exceptions to be taken after the jury retired. In
the third place, there was only one set of instructions
read to the jury and that set was given to the jury, and
consequently was not available for inspection by counsel.
It seems rather obvious that it would be difficult
for counsel, listening to the reading of a long set of
instructions to recall just what was given, and this
would especially be true where the judge had lulled
counsel into a feeling of security by promising to give
the substance of a particular instruction.
As soon as the verdict was rendered, the judge discharged the jury before counsel had access to the set of
instructions which had been given to the jury.
In accordance with the procedure adopted by the trial
court, with the stipulation of counsel, that the requirements
of Rule 51 be waived, and in accordance with Rule 46 U.R.C.P,
and the principles set forth in Hanks v. Christensen, supra,
the court should not deny defendants a new trial where a jury
instruction of crucial importance was not given in substance
even though the court had told counsel that it was included in
stock instructions being given.

POINT II
IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS DISCRETIONARY POWER UNDER RULE
51 TO GRANT DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL.
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After setting forth the customary procedure for objecting
to written jury instructions, Rule 51, U.R.C.P. states:
. . .Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the
appellate court, in its discretion and in the interest of
justice, may review the giving or failure to give an
instruction.
Although exercising the powers under this clause should
be the exception and not the rule, the Supreme Court of Utah
has said in McCall v. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962
(1954), that it is properly invoked to "extricate a person
from a situation where some gross injustice or inequity would
otherwise result."
If it is the purpose of the court by this case to effect
a change in the long-standing and widely followed practice of
permitting counsel to reserve exceptions to jury instructions,
then such a broad change of customary procedure can best be
accomplished, without exemplary injustice to the defendants
herein, by the court invoking its discretionary power under
Rule 51 and serving the trial court and members of the bar
with notice that hereafter the requirements of Rule 51 will be
strictly applied.

Otherwise, these defendants become a sac-

rificial lamb to a custom and practice which these defendants
did not institute.

If the custom of reserving exceptions to

jury instructions is to be the subject of reform, then it should
be accomplished without personal penalty to these defendants.
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CONCLUSION
By premising its decision on the technical procedural
issue of timely objection, this court has failed to meet the
issue intended by the trial court and by counsel for decision
here, namely, whether the instructions to the jury were defective in failing to tell them that contributory negligence
should bar recovery by the plaintiffs.
Strict compliance with Rule 51 should not be required in
this case because (a) it was waived by stipulation of counsel
with approval by the court, (b) prevailing circumstances qualify for waiver of objection under Rule 46 and earlier decisions
of this court, and (c) in the interests of justice the court
should invoke its discretion under Rule 51 to review the jury
instructions notwithstanding any failure of technical compliance,
Respectfully submitted,
POELMAN, FOX, /EDWARDS &^SWALD
By
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LLOYD POELMAN
36 South State Street
Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Served two (2) copies of the foregoing
Petition for Rehearing by delivering
them to E. H. Fankhauser at 430 Judge
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
7th day of July, 1976.
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